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Globally, the spread and use of suicide bombing attacks have become a regular 
occurrence. Security studies literature focuses primarily on conventional suicide 
bombing attacks. However, a growing trend has been observed on the adoption of 
complex suicide attacks. Using Al-Shabaab as a case study, this paper 
investigates the phenomenon of complex suicide attacks. We explore the tactical 
differences of complex suicide attacks vis-à-vis simple attacks in terms of its 
target goal, discriminative lethality, and delivery method. The paper relies on a 
uniquely constructed dataset of the group’s suicide operations, employing a 
variety of data collection techniques. The findings reveal that, inter alia, complex 
suicide attacks reduce civilian casualties compared to simple suicide attacks. 
Contrary to the group’s intent and official guidelines to target foreign entities; 
findings illustrate that domestic targets bear the brunt of most complex suicide 
attacks. These findings have the potential to contribute to counter-terrorism 
strategies and be adopted by concerned states in order to effectively protect 
significant loss of lives and destruction of property resulting from suicide 
terrorism. 
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Global terror networks continue to pose a security threat to the African continent. 
Amongst the most active violent extremist organisations (VEOs) in Africa are Boko 
Haram in Nigeria, the Tuareg group in Mali, Al-Qaeda in Sudan, Al-Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb and Al-Shabaab in East Africa. Over the past two decades, the spread 
of terrorism and extremism in East Africa has intensified 1. The region is home to one of 
Africa’s most adaptable and notorious VEOs — the Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahidin 
(commonly known as Al-Shabaab). It is reported that this group is the cause of the most 
intractable terrorist threat in sub-Saharan Africa 2. Al-Shabaab is associated with more 
violence than any other terrorist group and was recognised in 2017 by the Armed 
Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) as the deadliest terrorist group in 
Africa 3. 
Whilst the group is primarily active in Somalia — claiming the lives of 
thousands of victims in recurrent onshore attacks — it maintains operational capability 
and reach into the broader East Africa region 4. Some notable examples of their 
successfully planned and executed transnational operations include the September 2013 
West Gate mall attack in Nairobi Kenya 5 and the July 2010 twin suicide bombing 
attacks in Kampala, Uganda 6. Suicide attacks committed by Al-Shabaab in Somalia and 
the broader East Africa region continue to surge. However, it is not the rapid increase in 
suicide attacks that is most troubling but the salient pattern that these attacks are 
growing in sophistication and becoming increasingly complex. 
Since 2013, Al-Shabaab has increasingly incorporated “complex” suicide attacks 
as part of its tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Whilst a variety of definitions of 
the term “complex attacks” has been suggested, this paper will use the definition 
originally proposed by the Office of the United Nations Assistance Mission in 






Afghanistan (UNAMA) who defined it as “…a deliberate and coordinated attack that 
includes a suicide device, more than one attacker, and more than one tactic (for 
instance, a suicide vehicle bomb) and small arms fire” 7. We acknowledge that prior to 
2008, well-coordinated attacks executed by organised insurgents involving non-suicide 
IED and small arms fire were referred to as complex attacks. Conversely, we define 
“simple attack” as the traditional suicide bombing operation involving one or more 
suicide bombers but absent of any assailants. Although the use of complex operations in 
suicide bombings is a common feature of Al-Shabaab’s TTP, several transnational 
terrorist groups have relied on this tactic for more than a decade. Whilst simple suicide 
attacks have received considerable scholarly analysis, in contrast, there is a dearth of 
academic literature on complex suicide attacks. 
Public and political debates concerning the surge in terrorism and extremism in 
East Africa are ongoing. A notable level of academic and research interest has emerged 
in an attempt to gain an understanding of the genuine rising threat of terrorism in the 
region. A review of the scholarly literature reveals that this body of research is currently 
limited to discussions about the Al-Shabaab group’s history and evolution 8, ideology 9, 
motivations 10 and general targeting tactics 11. Significant research is also devoted to 
counterterrorism narrative discourses which seek to defeat Al-Shabaab’s ideology and 
recruitment strategies 12. This paper departs from this familiar line of scholarly inquiry 
and looks into the phenomenon of the complex suicide attacks which the group 
employs. 
An emerging trend of Al-Shabaab’s adoption of complex suicide attacks is 
observed, and numerous examples include the African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM) base in El-Adde (15 January 2015), presidential palace, Villa Somalia (21 
February 2014), Mogadishu courthouse (14 April 2013). In this paper, we contend that 






the phenomenon of complex suicide attacks escapes crucial empirical examination in a 
vast body of suicide terrorism literature. This is despite the fact that Al-Shabaab is 
increasingly becoming reliant on using the tactic of complex suicide attacks. We also 
believe it is imperative to understand and learn about the dynamics of complex suicide 
attacks so that policymakers can remain better informed when formulating 
counterterrorism strategies. 
To fill this gap, this paper aims to address the following research question: how 
fundamentally different are complex suicide attacks from simple suicide attacks in 
terms of target goal, discriminative lethality, and delivery methods? 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the following section, we 
introduce contextual information about the strategic and tactical efforts of suicide 
bombings. We specifically theorise the motivation behind the adoption of complex 
attacks using Al-Shabaab as a case study. We then present our unique constructed 
dataset that tracks Al-Shabaab’s suicide bombing operations from 2006 to 2018. The 
following sections present our results and discuss the key findings. We conclude the 
paper by outlining the implications of these findings for both academic and policy 
audiences. 
 
Dying to kill 
 
Studying suicide terrorism has become an important aspect of international 
focus, given the ongoing insurgencies in the Middle East and Africa. Indeed, for more 
than three decades, suicide bombings — and the pervasive, unpredictable threat of such 
attacks — have captured the attention of the global media because of their higher 
fatality rates, catastrophic destruction, and widespread terror 13. As is now common 
amongst many present-day VEOs, perpetrators have developed sophisticated TTPs for 
conducting these attacks, which have occurred on land, sea, and in the air. Dolnik 14 






believes that suicide attacks are the “ultimate terrorist tactic” and that they are the most 
dominant, fastest-spreading type of terrorist attack across Africa and the Middle East. 
Suicide bombings can be conducted for a variety of reasons — political, religious or 
ideological — and they may be carried out for tactical or symbolic purposes 15. More 
than other tactics, suicide bombings are “devastatingly effective, lethally efficient, have 
a greater likelihood of success, and are relatively inexpensive and generally easier to 
execute than other attack modes” 16. The purpose of suicide bombings is often to 
strategically coerce the state to make concessions about territory or governance 17. 
The actual deployment of suicide bombings has become much more 
sophisticated over time, as can be seen from more massive, coordinated attacks, and 
attacks by groups in foreign countries (such as 9/11). For instance, beginning in the year 
2000, Chechen terrorists were the first to use large scale barricade hostage-taking 
operations in conjunction with suicide bombers. Often, groups purposefully choose to 
conduct such attacks instead of using other TTPs because they are perceived as being 
“effective”. Success, or lack of it, however, is less relevant to terrorist groups when 
deciding whether or not to conduct suicide attacks. 
Between the late 1980s and early 1990s, suicide bombings were identified as a 
phenomenon rooted in irrationality 18. However, these early assumptions, hitherto the 
dominant paradigm in terrorism studies 19, have been rejected by recent studies, and an 
updated strategic model has been introduced. The current strategic model explains 
terrorist behaviour through a rationalist lens. It is based on key parameters that include 
motivations based on political preferences. This implies that terrorists evaluate the 
potential benefits of the choices available to them, and adopt violent tactics when the 
perceived benefits are greater than those apparent through other available options. An 






insurgent group may opt to conduct suicide attacks for a variety of strategic and tactical 
reasons, and this has been widely discussed in literature20. 
One growing voice that looks beyond the irrational/rational debate is the focus 
on religion as an important factor when groups conduct suicide attacks21. Indeed, 
Berman and Laitin 22 argued that suicide attacks were executed more successfully when 
employed by religious organisations. Henne23 finds that religious insurgent groups place 
a greater emphasis on indiscriminately killing as many people as possible and as such 
were more likely to carry out suicide attacks. Religious insurgent groups, especially 
when they are also orientated as ethnonationalist in organisation (e.g., Al-Shabaab) 
launch deadlier attacks. This performance of violence is partly motivated to impress a 
supernatural audience24. 
As terrorist groups continue to become increasingly innovative and effective, 
suicide attacks continue to be instrumental in challenging and attacking governing 
authorities for years to come. 
 
Complex suicide attacks: an unexplored phenomenon 
 
The empirical literature on terrorism has abundant studies on simple suicide bombings. 
However, there is a scarcity of academic studies on the phenomenon of complex suicide 
attacks, even though the employment of complex operations is now ubiquitous amongst 
terrorist organisations around the globe. The Taliban conducted the first example of a 
complex attack on 14 January 2008 when a group of four Taliban members, using 
suicide bombs, grenades, and automatic rifles attacked the Serena Hotel in Kabul, 
Afghanistan, killing six people and wounding six others. Henceforth, several VEOs, 
including Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Islamic State and Al-Qaeda, have employed this type of 
tactic. 






In more recent incidents of suicide terrorism, a pattern has emerged where 
complex attacks that target military bases or other government structures start with a 
suicide bomber in order to break through the initial line of defence. This complex attack 
allows additional assailants, either more armed suicide bombers or attackers armed with 
firearms or other weapons, to swarm or raid the desired target. Since suicide bombings 
cause mass destruction and chaos, employing them as part of complex attacks helps to 
focus these defences on a specific area, thereby weakening defences in other parts of the 
targeted entity. 
From a hard target’s perspective, it also makes sense that these more fortified 
structures and targets are more difficult to attack with a single assailant, or with a single 
bomber. The inclusion of several assailants with a number of different weapons allows 
for a higher likelihood of success. Hoffman’s 25 assessment of suicide bombers as the 
ultimate smart bomb, by including a suicide bomber in complex attacks, makes sense 
strategically and tactically. Such a tactic allows the bomber to identify and strike the 
weak point of the intended target’s security. For instance, Kliot and Charney 26 
discovered that the building of the Israeli West Bank barrier changed the attack patterns 
of suicide bombers. Specifically, the authors found that bombers carried out attacks in 
areas where the fence was incomplete. Previous examinations of observational patterns 
suggest that suicide bombings in complex attacks are merely used as tactical tools 
against hard targets and weakened defences of a targeted entity. Importantly, these 
insights do not answer fundamental questions about the dynamic differences in relation 
to simple attacks, in terms of target goal, discriminative lethality and delivery methods. 
We seek to fill this gap in the literature through a case study on Al-Shabaab, one of the 
deadliest terrorist groups in Africa that relies heavily on complex suicide operations. 






As we aim to investigate how complex suicide attacks differ from simple suicide 
attacks in terms of target, lethality, and delivery, it is important that we hypothesise why 
Al-Shabaab might employ complex suicide attacks in lieu of simple suicide attacks by 
looking at the target goal, discriminative lethality, and delivery methods. To investigate 
this, the following sections will briefly discuss the theoretical underpinnings of why Al- 
Shabaab might utilise complex suicide attacks to explicitly target foreign forces in 
Somalia, enhance precision in lethality and deploy sophisticated delivery methods. 
 
Target goal 
One cannot deny that suicide terrorism is often perceived as successful in achieving the 
immediate objectives of VEOs. Following the Marine Barracks Bombing in Lebanon in 
1983, US President Reagan ordered the withdrawal of American troops within four 
months 27. This is one of the many examples of the perceived success of suicide attacks 
supporting the strategic argument for suicide terrorism. In considering the ratio of 
terrorists killed to enemy victims associated with suicide terrorism, the justification for 
the use of this tactic against a superior combatant force is clear. Pape notes a correlation 
in his research between foreign military occupation and an increase in suicide terrorist 
activity 28. Pape expounded that the rise of suicide bombings is related to nationalist 
sentiment seeking to drive out foreign occupying forces, primarily when the foreign 
occupiers are of a different religion and are seen as promoting ideals of liberal 
democracy 29. A relationship between suicide bombings and foreign occupation has 
been substantiated and acknowledged in a number of case studies, and several authors 
have proposed that suicide bombing is a result of foreign occupation 30. VEOs adopt this 
tactic to raise the ante against the foreign occupier whilst simultaneously raising the 
media profile of their campaign, thus pressuring the occupier into leaving. 






Suicide bombings in East Africa started gaining in trajectory the moment 
Ethiopia invaded Somalia in December 2006. Ethiopia ended its two-year occupation of 
Somalia in 2009, and its occupation was replaced by AMISOM. At this time, Al- 
Shabaab shifted the foreign occupier tag to AMISOM forces. AMISOM was initially 
deployed in Somalia in March 2007 to, inter alia, reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab 
and other armed groups. Its military component comprised troops from Burundi, Sierra 
Leone, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. Given that Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia 
share a long and complex history riddled with mutual fear, suspicion and territorial 
expansionist ideologies, it is ironic that the same Ethiopian and Kenyan troops who 
invaded Somalia in 2011 were redeployed as part of AMISOM in 2012 and 2014. 
This is compounded by the fact that journalists and politicians frequently 
describe the AMISOM mission as a “peacekeeping” deployment, tasked to conduct 
“peace support operations” and protect Somalia's fragile government. However, 
AMISOM as a peacekeeping mission does not conform to the three basic principles that 
define peacekeeping — impartial non-use of force except in self-defence, the consent of 
the warring parties and the defence of a mission's mandate. Consequently, Al-Shabaab 
refuses to approve of the presence of AMISOM forces, as the mission was 
unquestionably established to lend support to Somalia’s government. AMISOM units 
have implemented offensive combat postures, and have mounted attacks against Al- 
Shabaab’s strongholds. Al-Shabaab categorically made clear in their communication 
that their primary targets are these foreign entities: 
Ethiopians, Kenyans, Ugandans, and Burundians are just like the English and 
the French because they have invaded the Islamic country of Somalia and 
launched a war on Islam and Muslims. The Experience of Our Brothers in 
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Al-Shabaab’s focus on targeting foreign entities is reinforced by the directives 
adopted by its umbrella organisation, Al-Qaeda, which has clear rules about the 
admissibility of targeting using suicide bombers. Al-Shabaab obligated itself to al- 
Qaeda with its first pledge of allegiance in 2012. Al-Qaeda’s central management set 
forth instructions as to how it should execute its attacks, being explicit in its guidelines 
when it comes to targeting individuals and entities. In 2013, in the group’s “General 
Guidelines for Jihad” 31 Al-Qaeda’s leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, issued directives that 
advise Al-Qaeda affiliated groups how to conduct certain attacks and how they should 
participate in “proper jihad”. In particular, Al-Qaeda’s branches, affiliates, and allies 
must avoid targeting those that are not at war with them, and must primarily focus on 
targeting the Crusader Alliance and secondarily focus on their local surrogates. 
Secondly, attacks against enemies that are housed in mosques, public gatherings where 
they mix with Muslims, or those who have not raised arms against them should be 
avoided 32. Al-Shabaab has failed to adhere to these general rules of engagement. Its 
relentless targeting of civilian populated areas such as hotels and restaurants is a sign of 
desperation, and clearly shows the group’s inability to drive AMISOM forces out of 
Somali territory. Al-Shabaab’s alternative strategy appears to be making the territories 
controlled by the Somali federal government and its member states ungovernable. 
Complex suicide attacks require sophisticated planning and resources and are 
renowned for their precision. Al-Shabaab has received sharp criticism for deviating 
from Al-Qaeda’s ethos of avoiding civilian targets and for its focus on foreign 
occupation forces. For the purposes of this study, an important and pertinent inquiry is 
the extent to which Al-Shabaab incorporates complex suicide attacks to specifically 
target foreign occupation forces such as AMISOM in Somalia, and avoids civilian 
targets or places 






where civilians and non-civilians mix, such as hotels and restaurants. Consequently, we 





It is important to note that there was initially disappointment from Al-Qaeda’s central 
leadership about how Al-Shabaab conducted its suicide attack operations. Al-Qaeda was 
quick to express its displeasure when the group overstepped its boundaries and made 
mistakes, such as attacking the Shamo Hotel in Mogadishu during a graduation 
ceremony for medical students in 2009. Al-Qaeda’s principal founder, Osama bin 
Laden, swiftly reproached Al-Shabaab for its callous targeting. Indeed, Al-Qaeda 
delineated clear rules for its “martyrdom operations” and the group has levelled 
plentiful criticism against Al-Shabaab for its intentional targeting of civilians. 
More precisely, various letters gleaned during the raid on bin Laden’s house in 
Abbottabad, Pakistan in 2011, revealed Al-Qaeda’s appeals to Al-Shabaab to steer clear 
of targeting civilians. One letter, composed in 2007, earnestly appealed to its recipient: 
“Please talk to the Somali brothers about reducing the harm to Muslims at Bakarah 
Market as result of attacking the headquarters of the African forces…Instead, they 
should focus on attacking them on their way to and from the airport” 33. 
Considering that simple suicide attacks incur a high civilian/non-civilian 
casualty ratio, we expect that our data would show that Al-Shabaab employs complex 
suicide attacks as a means to improve precision and adhere to Al-Qaeda’s clear rules in 




VEOs employ diverse tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). Some successful 






tactics — many of which are well-suited to urban environments — include the use of 
ambushes, IEDs or suicide bombs, arson, assassinations, kidnappings, extortion, and 
missiles 34. However, the choice of tactics, targets and weapons is influenced by a 
group’s ideology, internal dynamics, leadership, and the environment 35. Surprisingly, 
there remain significant gaps in the literature concerning the preferred weaponry of 
militants. This is more true for academic discussion on suicide IEDs, where it has been 
heavily asserted that they have become the weapon of choice for VEOs around the 
globe 36. Most authors do not mention this type of weapon at all, whilst others 
acknowledge that IEDs are threats and will continue to remain so but provide few (if 
any) details as to their construction and tactical employment 37. 
Suicide attacks predominantly employ suicide belts (commonly referred to as 
person-borne improvised explosive device (PBIEDs)), used by perpetrators who 
approach their targets on foot, or suicide vehicle bombs (commonly referred to as 
suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs)) which involve a driver 
who steers a vehicle laden with explosives towards a target. The latter method tends to 
use civilian cars, minibuses, and trucks and allows for the covert delivery of larger 
charges into a target area, as the explosives can be concealed in the vehicle. Considering 
that complex suicide attacks are defined as attacks that employ multiple hostile 
elements and different weapon systems, we expect that our data would show that Al- 
Shabaab will predominately deploy more motorised weapons such as explosive-laden 






We constructed a unique dataset of Al-Shabaab suicide bombings, employing an 






assortment of data collection techniques. The dataset includes 208 incidents from 
September 2006 until the end of December 2018. We included any suicide attack where 
Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility or where at least two sources attributed blame to the 
group. The sources who attributed blame to the group were carefully and objectively 
considered. Each suicide attack incident included information on the country and 
city/town/village of incident, the number of civilian and non-civilian fatalities and 
injuries, target type, hard or soft target, type of IED, the number of perpetrators, gender, 
whether it was a complex or a simple attack and instances of non-detonation or 
prevention of suicide attacks, amongst others. The dataset originally was formulated 
based on the skeleton dataset of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). However, we 
found that it was missing the years 2006-2009 and 2017-2018 and that the database 
erroneously attributed suicide bombing attacks perpetrated by other Somalia based 
Islamist militant organisations (e.g., Hizbul Islam) to Al-Shabaab. Furthermore, we 
noted that the database made no distinction between complex and simple suicide 
attacks. 
To remedy this, we have expanded the data from the original seven variables  
and added the missing years (2006 to 2009 and 2017 to 2018) by comparing entries with 
data drawn from Factiva. We culled online newspaper stories containing the search 
strings Al-Shabaab OR Al-Shabab AND bomb OR bombing and filled the missing  
years with data acquired from news articles. We iteratively went through the data, and 
to maximise the reliability of data, we extensively cross-referenced and validated it with 
news sources in the English and Somali languages from September 2006 to December 
2018. We analysed the news articles from when the first suicide attack was reported and 
from the subsequent 15 days to accurately plot the latest casualty figures. A 
comprehensive database was created based on our coding detailing 20 variables of each 






suicide bombing (which includes, inter alia, different types of fatalities, delivery 
systems, gender, claimed by Al-Shabaab), where such data was available. As a caveat, 
our data and subsequent verification checks regarding fatalities should be viewed as 
minimums, with the actual numbers being possibly higher. 
 
Juxtaposition of simple suicide attacks and complex suicide attacks 
 
Al-Shabaab’s general suicide operations 
 
Our dataset reveals that from the group’s first deployment of suicide bombing in 
September 2006 up until December 2018, we find 208 instances of suicide bombing 
deployed by Al-Shabaab involving 277 individual bombers. Out of the 208 total suicide 
attacks, 54 were complex suicide attacks. Based on our dataset – which we believe to be 
the best available data on the Al-Shabaab group – we reveal that to date, Al-Shabaab’s 
suicide operations have claimed, at a minimum, 2,979 (excluding the lives of the 
bombers, which adds another 277) suicide bombing related deaths. 
In assessing the lethality of suicide bombing operations, the majority of studies 
calculate it as the number of fatalities per attack or operation. The University of 
Chicago’s dataset estimates that between 1974 and 2016 there were a total of 5,430 
suicide attacks causing 55,022 deaths, which indicates that the average suicide bombing 
operation killed 10.13 people. Al-Shabaab’s average lethality stands at 14.32 fatalities 
per attack, far higher than the world’s average. However, the average number of 
fatalities per suicide attack is slanted upward as a result of the Zoobe October 2017 
suicide attack in Mogadishu, which killed 587 people. This single attack represents the 
world’s deadliest terrorist attack since the September 11 twin tower bombings in New 
York, US. Omitting this outlier event, its lethality rate per attack falls to around 11.5 








deaths per attack, which is still higher than the approximate average amongst global 
groups using suicide bombing. 
Our data show that after the group’s first inroad into suicide bombing, it did not 
consistently deploy suicide bombers for several years (see Table 1). Indeed, from 2006 
to 2010, Al-Shabaab averaged less than one suicide operation per month. The 
intermittent use of suicide bombing during the early stages of Al-Shabaab’s operations 
can be clarified by the group’s efforts to hold its territorial holdings in Somalia against 
external actors. The Ethiopian army and other international actors have sought to regain 
control of both Mogadishu and Al-Shabaab’s strongholds in the southern port city of 
Kismayo. As a result, in its effort to maintain its holdings, Al-Shabaab focused on 
waging conventional warfare rather than resorting to the more asymmetric tactic of 
suicide bombing. 
 
Table 1. Al-Shabaab's suicide bombing operations over time 
 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total 
January     1  2 3 1 2 3 3  15 
February    1 1 1 2 1 2 1 4 2 2 17 
March  1     1 3 3 1 2 4 3 18 
April  1 1    2 1  3 1 2 4 15 
May    1 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 3 1 16 
June  4  1  2 1  1 4 4 5 1 23 
July  1   2   2 4 4 4 1 1 19 
August     1 1 1  2 3 3 2 2 15 
September 1   1 1 1 2 2 1 3 1 5 2 21 
October  1 5   4 1 2 2  5 3 2 25 
November 1     1 1 1  3 2 1 3 13 
December    1  1 1 1 2 1 3 1 1 12 
Total 2 8 6 5 7 12 15 17 21 26 35 32 22 208 
 
 
In 2009, Al-Shabaab deepened its ties with Al-Qaeda but did not formally merge 
with the organisation. Consequently, it began expanding and increasing its suicide 
bombing tactics as it began to focus on using new means to assist in its primary push to 






capture Somalia’s capital city, Mogadishu, and develop a footprint outside Somalia’s 
borders. With an influx of recruits and higher prestige, suicide bombings seemed to 
become a more practicable option in its arsenal of violence. As AMISOM sought to 
launch offensives and expand outward, Al-Shabaab increased its person-borne IED and 
suicide vehicle bombs attacks to halt any forward progress. In 2011 Al-Shabaab applied 
considerable force in response to pressure from external actors, by including the 
adoption of suicide bombings. The group’s suicide bombings increased steadily over 
this period, from less than five attacks per year to one bombing per month. 
Since February 2012, when it officially merged with Al-Qaeda, the number of 
complex attack operations has steadily increased each year. The year with the highest 
number of Al-Shabaab’s suicide bombings was 2016, with a total of 35, or 3 per month. 
Since our data extends to December 2018, we see that the group was on track to 
experience a significant weakening in its use of bombings in the year 2018 to less than 
two per month. 
The group’s investment in suicide bombing may have ties to Ethiopia’s military 
intervention in Somalia in December 2006. In addition to Al-Shabaab’s expanding 
coercive military power, the years 2010 and 2011 saw a significant increase in the 
group’s propensity to use suicide bombings against both Somali and international 
targets. The group progressively deployed several suicide bombers to attack the same 
target, probably to increase degradation. In Figure 1, we illustrate Al-Shabaab's suicide 
bombing operations since its inception in 2006 up to December 2018. 




Figure 1. Timeline of simple and complex attacks 










































Al-Shabaab’s first bombing operation in 2006 was a complex attack involving 
both suicide bombers and lightly armed infantry. The tactic was used to assassinate then 
Somali president, Abdullahi Yusuf. A suicide bomber driving a car bomb smashed into 
Yusuf’s convoy outside the National Parliament in Baidoa, Somalia. The attack killed 
four of Yusuf’s bodyguards as well as Yusuf’s brother. Six Al-Shabaab attackers were 
also killed in the ensuing gun battle. Despite the apparent success of the attack, the 
group did not attempt another complex suicide operation for more than three years. In 
August 2010, Al-Shabaab mounted another complex suicide attack that targeted the 
Muna Hotel in Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab assailants dressed as Somali government 
security personnel attacked the building where a two-hour gun battle ensued until one of 
the gunmen detonated his explosive vest. The attack claimed the lives of 32 people, 











Up until the start of 2013, a common pattern in Al-Shabaab’s suicide operations 
was that the suicide bomber was the focal point of the operation. Gunmen generally 
played a supporting role, wherein they breached the security perimeter and ensured that 
the suicide bombers reached their objective. Following the successful operations 
adopted by their international counterparts such as the Taliban, Al-Shabaab modified 
their formula in early 2013, deploying suicide bombers to weaken the initial line of 
protection, whilst assailants equipped with small arms entered the premise and did most 
of the killing. 
 
Target 
In simple attacks conducted between 2006 and 2018 (see Figure 2), the targeting 
patterns reveal that Somali federal government institutions and personnel account for 39 
percent of the total simple targets. The next most frequented targets were places 
patronised entirely by civilians, and these accounted for 15.1 percent of total targets. 
One example of such a place was a local market in the town of Wanlaweyn where a 
person-borne IED killed at least 14 people and wounded more than 15 others. Between 
the years 2006 and 2011, the pattern of simple attacks began with a focus on Somali 
federal government institutions, Ethiopian and African Union (AU) bases. It was only 
after 2012 that Al-Shabaab began changing its pattern and started targeting civilians 
whilst intensifying its attacks on the federal government of Somalia. Conversely, the 
primary targets of complex attacks (see Figure 2) are Somali federal government 
institutions and personnel, accounting for 46.2 percent of total complex attacks. The 
second most targeted entity are the hotels which Al-Shabaab alleges were frequented by 
government officials. These attacks accounted for 21.2 percent of total complex attacks 
whilst AU bases were the third primary target, standing at 19.2 percent of total complex 
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attacks. After merging with Al-Qaeda in 2012, Al-Shabaab adopted the use of complex 
attacks, employing them steadily against the groups mentioned above. 
In the case of simple attacks, 28.8 percent of attacks allegedly carried out by Al- 
Shabaab were not claimed by the group. Security forces thwarted close to 43 percent of 
these failed attacks or the suicide bomber(s) detonated them prematurely. However, in 





Our data reveals that with simple attacks, the average lethality per attack on non- 
civilians is 2.04 deaths per attack, whereas, for civilians, it is 9.36 fatalities per attack 
(see Table 2). The combined average lethality is 11.40 deaths per attack. This low 
average lethality rate is supplemented by the number of failed attacks for this particular 
mode. A total of 23 simple attacks (14.94 percent), almost one-sixth of the total number 
of attacks, detonated prematurely, thus killing the suicide bomber(s), or the attacks were 
foiled by security forces. The simple attacks account for almost three quarters (74.04 






percent) of Al-Shabaab’s total suicide operations to date. Whilst Al-Shabaab has 
targeted more hard targets in carrying out simple attacks, the yearly data reveal that 
civilian fatalities are always higher than the non-civilian fatalities. Indeed, the civilian- 
combatant death rate for simple attacks reveals that 82 percent of all casualties were 
civilians and only 18 percent were combatants. 
Conversely, in complex attacks, the average lethality per attack for non-civilians 
was measured at 14.3 deaths per attack, whilst for civilians, it stood at 9.40 deaths per 
attack, with a total success rate of 94.23 percent. The combined average lethality was 
measured at 23.5 fatalities per operation. Between 2012 and 2014, when complex 
attacks were slowly being introduced, civilian fatalities significantly outweighed non- 
civilian casualties. From 2014 the rate of fatalities for non-civilians was significantly 
higher than for civilians. Statistics for the year 2018 reveal that there were more civilian 
deaths than non-civilian deaths, for the first time since the adoption of the tactic. 
However, the overall civilian-combatant death rate reveals that there were more 
combatants’ fatalities (60 percent) than civilian casualties (40 percent). 
 
Table 2. Lethality of simple and complex attacks 
 























































Al-Shabaab uses a mixture of delivery systems to conduct their simple and complex 
attacks. Of the 154 simple attacks (see Figure 3) conducted by Al-Shabaab, 64.29 
percent events involved suicide vehicle bombs whilst 31.17 percent incorporated only 
person-borne IEDs. Only 4.55 percent utilised both devices in their simple attacks. 




2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2011 2012 
YEARS 





















































Figure 3. Timeline of delivery methods in simple attacks 
 
 
Al-Shabaab introduced their simple attacks with suicide vehicle bombs in 2006, 
and the use of person-borne IEDs was relatively low at the time. However, from 2009, 
the number of person-borne IEDs and suicide vehicle bombs used in attacks were 
balanced and this is most noticeable between 2009 and 2011. From 2011 up to 2014, 
Al-Shabaab relied on person-borne IEDs as their main delivery system. The year 2014 
revealed a significant drop in the use of person-borne IEDs in simple attacks, with a 
substantial gradual adoption of suicide vehicle bombs whilst person-borne IEDs were 
being phased out. One possible explanation for this is that between 2012 and 2013, a 
total of 8 instances of failed attacks were recorded for simple attacks, with 87.5 percent 
being operations where only person-borne IEDs were employed. Consequently, to 
decrease the number of failed attacks, Al-Shabaab placed greater weight on utilising 
SVIBEDs in all their future simple attacks. This is evident in 2017, where suicide 
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Conversely, in 54 complex attacks (see Figure 4) the group relied heavily on 
suicide vehicle bombs. Indeed, 74.07 percent of all complex attacks employed suicide 
vehicle bombs whilst a mere 5.56 percent adopted person-borne IEDs. A significant 



















Figure 4. Timeline of delivery methods in complex attacks 
 
 
Al-Shabaab’s initial foray into the use of complex attacks primarily adopted the 
use of person-borne IEDs. Only after 2012, when Al-Shabaab officially joined Al- 
Qaeda, did they predominantly adopt suicide vehicle bombs as their main delivery 
system, using person-borne IEDs only on one occasion in 2014. To date, suicide vehicle 
bombs remain the dominant delivery system for both modes. 
 











Multiple Devices Count 
Simple attacks 154 48 (31.17%) 99 (64.29%) 7 (4.55%) 













This study closely examines complex and simple suicide attacks, exploring the tactical 
differences between complex suicide attacks and simple suicide attacks in terms of 
target goal, discriminative lethality and delivery methods. We now discuss our findings 
concerning our research question in Section 1 and its theoretical underpinnings 
discussed in Section 2. In each subsection, we begin with our findings on complex 
suicide attacks in comparison to simple attacks by looking at target goal, discriminative 
lethality and delivery methods. In this section, we argue that there is evidence that 
complex suicide attacks reduce civilian casualties. We show evidence that suicide 
vehicle bombs remain the most popular devices used in complex suicide operations. 
Whilst complex suicide attacks were introduced to improve precision and soften the 
layers of security whilst aligning with Al-Qaeda’s guidelines in attacking foreign forces, 
we show evidence that this is not the case, as most of the targets were primarily 
domestic targets. Finally, we discuss why complex suicide attacks are in decline. 
 
Domestic targets bear the major brunt of complex attacks 
 
The first element of our research question is whether complex suicide attacks 
predominantly target foreign entities. An important strand of the empirical literature on 
suicide terrorism maintains that militants are prompted to use suicide attacks when 
faced with foreign occupation or military intervention from a foreign power. Pape 38, 
Pape and Feldman 39, Collard-Wexler et al. 40 and Choi and Piazza 41 argue that non- 
state armed groups notably use terrorist suicide attacks against foreign military 
occupations. 
Based on our data, we find no evidence that there is a significant increase in 
targeting foreign forces when complex suicide attacks are employed. There was only a 
2.9 percent increase on foreign targets by simple suicide attacks (17.5 percent) to 






complex attacks (20.4 percent). Even though the general guidelines outlined by Al- 
Qaeda for its affiliates designate the purpose of using complex suicide attacks against 
foreign targets, the majority of complex suicide attacks were aimed at Somalia’s fragile 
government, accounting for 44.4 percent of all complex attacks. The second most 
frequent target deployment was against hotels (20.4 percent), especially hotels where 
Somali government officials and the elite congregated. Indeed, hotels are seen as a 
token of “Western culture” where there is free mixing between men and women and 
alcohol is consumed 42. 
Furthermore, hotels are perceived as places which house international aid 
workers, Western journalists, foreign officials, and members of governments that 
“fraternise” with the West. Indeed, in a 2017 interview, Al-Shabaab’s spokesperson, 
Sheikh Ali Dheere, justified targeting certain hotels primarily due to their appearance, 
as some hotels in Mogadishu are built like fortresses, with high surrounding walls 43. 
Surprisingly, there were no coordinated attacks against restaurants whilst all recorded 
suicide attacks against restaurants emanated from simple suicide attacks. The third most 
frequented target and the theoretical aim of complex attacks are AU bases, accounting 
for 18.5 percent of total complex attacks. 
More broadly, our data reveals that 74.1 percent of all complex suicide attacks 
were deployed against Somali targets (government institutions, personnel and civilians) 
whilst only 20.4 percent were deployed against foreign targets (mainly AU bases) 
revealing no significant shift in the primary target between both modes. Whilst the 
majority of simple attacks (67.5 percent) were aimed at Somali targets, our data 
demonstrate that there was an increase of 6.6 percent in complex suicide attacks aimed 
at domestic targets. This contravenes the strategic objective espoused by Al-Shabaab’s 
spokesperson where he explicitly stated that their primary goal is “…defending our 






nation, religion and dignity” 44 which logically would see a decrease in attacks against 
domestic targets. However, unravelling the rhetoric, Wood, Kathman, and Gent 45 
determine that international interventions carve the tactical behaviour of insurgents and 
that this behaviour is modified by which side of the conflict the foreign power 
intervenes in. In scenarios where direct foreign intervention aims to weaken a domestic 
combatant, Wood and his colleagues argue that VEOs are more likely to attack civilians 
and to violate human rights and adopt violent non-conventional tactics. For Al-Shabaab 
to predominately target domestic actors is in harmony with the conventional 
understanding of the strategic objectives of suicide attacks. Such attacks are aimed at 
undermining state/local governments, demonstrating their vulnerability, instilling fear 
amongst the people and portraying the VEO as strong and resolute in order to attract 
more recruits 46. However, this strategic objective is based on the assumption that the 
country does not host an assortment of pro-government foreign troops, which is not the 
case in Somalia. 
Thus, we find that in the case of complex attacks’ primary targets, there is an 
increase in domestic targets when complex suicide attacks are employed. Domestic 
spaces, not foreign targets, remain the primary theorised intended targets, and this is in 
line with the targeting patterns of simple suicide attacks. Whilst a significant portion of 
simple suicide attacks were deployed against international personnel and UN 
institutions; complex suicide attacks veered towards increasing attacks against mainly 
domestic actors and AU forces. Consequently, our findings contravene the longstanding 
assertion by experts that suicide terrorism is mainly aimed at foreign forces47. 
 
Complex suicide attacks have a lower civilian casualty rate 
 
Here we explore the second part of our research question considering whether complex 
suicide attacks are discriminatively employed to reduce civilian collateral damage from 






simple suicide attacks as outlined in Al-Qaeda’s guidelines. 
 
Prior to merging with Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab was criticised by Al-Qaeda for its 
disproportionate targeting of non-combatants. Before adopting complex suicide attacks, 
Al-Shabaab’s track record in conventional suicide attacks had a high civilian casualty 
rate even though the majority of its suicide operations were aimed at hard targets. This 
is evident in the fact that for 37 simple suicide attacks conducted between 2006 and 
2011, a significant majority (73.72 percent) of the victims were civilians. This has been 
the case even after the fact that Al-Shabaab incorporated complex suicide attacks as part 
of its existing modus operandi to reduce civilian casualties. This is manifested in the 
years between 2013 and 2018, when the majority of fatalities from simple attacks was 
incurred by civilians (85 percent). 
Based on our data, we find that for the 54 complex attacks that were conducted 
by Al-Shabaab, the majority of the fatalities (60 percent) were military and political 
targets whilst civilians suffered 40 percent of the fatalities. This is in stark contrast to 
the civilian fatalities caused by simple attacks (82 percent) with only 18 percent being 
military and political targets. Indeed, our data reveals that there is no significant 
difference in the hard and soft targeting patterns for simple and complex suicide attacks. 
The complex suicide attacks report a 10 percent increase in targeting hard-to-reach 
areas whereas there is only 1 percent difference in soft targets between simple and 
complex suicide attacks. It demonstrates that whilst the hard and soft targeting patterns 
for both modes are more and less the same, there is a significant reduction of 42 percent 
in civilian casualties in complex attacks. 
More importantly, when analysing complex suicide attacks, our data confirm 
that the civilian-to-combatant ratio is dramatically reduced, serving as a stabiliser to the 










Finally, it’s of strategic importance for the group to minimise the civilian 
casualties as much as possible. One, it aids the group’s perennial goal which is to 
establish itself as a legitimate alternative to any perceived legitimate government. 
Indeed, by predominantly targeting government personnel or anyone who affiliates with 
the governing body in civilian spaces, Al-Shabaab aims to erode the credibility and 
legitimacy of the Somali government, thus exposing its inherent weakness and fragility. 
Secondly, by avoiding or minimising civilian casualties when conducting complex 
suicide operations, Al-Shabaab adheres to the guiding principle set forth by Al-Qaeda’s 
general command. 
 
Suicide vehicle bombs remain the most popular delivery system in complex 
attacks 
 
In this section, we look at the third element of our research question, which investigates 
whether complex suicide attacks rely more heavily on motorised weapons such as 
explosive-laden vehicles, cars or truck bombs, than do simple suicide attacks. 
Employing suicide vehicle bombs can enable a numerically and technologically 
inferior force to strike the enemy using large explosive payloads accurately. Therefore, 
this is regarded as one of the most popular methods of attack for a variety of VEOs, 
mainly due to its powerful role as a force multiplier. 
Based on our data, we find that for the 54 complex attacks conducted by Al- 
Shabaab, 74.07 percent of the operations used suicide vehicle bombs solely as their 
delivery methods whilst for simple attacks, it was 64.29 percent, revealing a significant 
increase of 9.78 percent. Both modes relied heavily on suicide vehicle bombs in their 
attacks. It is worth mentioning that multiple devices (suicide vehicle bombs and person- 
borne IEDs) were adopted to a certain extent in complex suicide attacks (20.37 percent) 









systems. Indeed, suicide vehicle bombs in complex attacks were mainly used against 
Somali military targets and hotels, and there have been no recorded instances of them 
being used against foreign targets. However, the case is reversed when it comes to 
person-borne IEDs. Almost one-third of simple attacks employed person-borne IEDs as 
part of their delivery systems whilst complex attacks only used person-borne IEDs in 3 
instances (5.56 percent) as the sole delivery system in their attacks. These three 
recorded events were conducted in the early years of complex suicide attacks, 
suggesting that they were proven to be ineffective. 
Similarly, although simple attacks have significantly used person-borne IEDs, 
most of the events were conducted in Al-Shabaab’s early years. One plausible 
explanation for why Al-Shabaab has stopped relying on person-borne IEDs is due to its 
high failure rate. Indeed, more than half (60.87 percent) of failed simple attacks 
emanated from events that solely employed person-borne IEDs as their delivery system. 
Thus, we find that our analysis of research data confirms that the majority of 
complex suicide attacks use suicide vehicle bombs (94.44 percent) as a single device or 
in conjunction with other devices. The increased use of suicide vehicle bombs by Al- 
Shabaab is no surprise to the authors, as this tactic served more established terrorist 
groups like Islamic State, or Daesh, well 48. It is understood that this tactic is dictated by 
the nature of asymmetric warfare, where one party has superior capability in weaponry 
over the other 49. Some analysts have emphasised the shock value suicide vehicle bombs 
have in disorienting enemy forces and causing chaos 50, and others argue that it is the 
perfect covert delivery system 51. 
Finally, we suspected that suicide vehicle bombs would be used less against soft 
targets, but all recorded complex suicide attacks against exclusive civilian spots 
employed suicide vehicle bombs. Even though suicide vehicle bombs require more 






resources, including the acquisition of explosives material, they remain Al-Shabaab’s 
primary delivery system of choice. 
 
Complex suicide attacks on the back foot 
Since the steady implementation of complex attacks in 2013, the yearly attacks have 
been gradually increasing up until late 2017 when for the first time, they began to 
decrease. Both simple and complex attacks have been waning, and 2018 data reveals a 
significant reduction in suicide attacks. The possible reasons why attacks have 
decreased include public outcry, targeted assassinations and lost territories. 
First, Al-Shabaab gains its legitimacy by espousing a cause that involves 
coercing foreign occupying forces to withdraw from Somalia and the establishment of 
an Islamic emirate. This sentiment has gained the group many constituents; however, 
significant trust and support can be eroded through targeting errors. Indeed, when a 
VEO selects a target that is regarded as illegitimate by their supporters (such as 
attacking spots frequented by civilians only), the VEO is faced with a significant loss of 
popular support 52. Our first possible suggestion is the targeting error that lead to the 
infamous Zoobe 2017 bombing event. In October 2017, Al-Shabaab launched its most 
devastating attack at a crowded junction in the centre of Mogadishu. The driver 
detonated a large suicide vehicle bomb in a heavily populated urban area, recording the 
highest number of casualties and the deadliest single incident in Somalia to date, with at 
least 587 victims killed and at least 316 victims wounded. Whilst Al-Shabaab has never 
publicly claimed responsibility for the Zoobe Junction attack; it is the only actor capable 
of an assault of that size. This targeting error sparked public outrage and large 
demonstrations of angry Somalis shouting slogans against Al-Shabaab. Even though 
this attack is classified as a simple suicide attack, the targeting error had a detrimental 
effect on all suicide bombing activities conducted by Al-Shabaab. 






Second, as an increasingly prominent tool in the “war on terror” the US 
government employed drone strikes 53. Since 2002, the United States has launched 
4,788 drone strikes against Al-Qaeda and their affiliates, including Al-Shabaab (The 
Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2018). More specifically, In March 2017, the use of 
American drones in Somalia intensified as low-level commanders were given the 
authority to designate targets and approve drone strikes. The air campaign has stalled 
Al-Shabaab’s tactical abilities, planted growing mistrust amongst its members, and 
severely restricted the mobility of its commanders. The introduction of multiple 
battlefronts, depletion in numbers of foreign fighters, internal divisions and increased 
level of defections have diminished Al-Shabaab’s operational capacity. Since the Zoobe 
truck-bombing, Al-Shabaab has faced an increasing stream of defections and better- 
coordinated counter-insurgency from AMISOM and the Somali security forces. 
Third, Al-Shabaab also faces significant financial hardships, especially after 
significant loss of territory to AMISOM and the Somali National Army (SNA). This 
includes loss of key seaports (Kismayo, Brava and Merca) which provided them with a 
constant stream of revenue. This indicates that Al-Shabaab is now cash-starved and 
financially weakened. The group has to rely on the collection of ‘taxes’ in the form of 
zakat, an obligatory Islamic 2.5 per cent of wealth tax, as an alternative source of 
income to fund its insurgency. However, this has put them at odds and in conflict with 
poor rural agriculture and livestock farming communities who initially accepted the 
levy out of the fear of the consequences of not paying. However, they later rejected 
these taxes and have subsequently taken up arms against Al-Shabaab. In the semi- 
autonomous Hir-Shabelle regional state of Somalia, a tribal group formed a militia, 
commonly known as Macawisley (sarong-wearing fighters), to reject Al-Shabaab’s 
stringent demands. 






Fourth, the arrival of the Islamic State (ISIS) group in the theatre of Somalia 
conflict has weakened Al-Shabaab’s dominance in the vast Somali territory. This means 
the group now faces multiple conflicts and adversaries, as well as their traditional 
enemies, AMISOM and SNA. The presence of an equally determined, militant and 
deadly contender in Somalia is a new threat faced by Al-Shabaab. 
Nevertheless, whilst complex attacks are lower in number than simple attacks, it 
has a greater bearing on Al-Shabaab’s long-term goal to destabilise the Somali federal 
government. Even though it is in decline, its efficacy to sustain Al-Shabaab’s relevancy 




This paper has sought to contribute to the existing literature on suicide terrorism. This 
paper provides the first in-depth look at the phenomenon of complex suicide attacks. 
Using Al-Shabaab as a case study, the authors explore the tactical differences between 
complex suicide attacks and simple suicide attacks in terms of target goal, 
discriminative lethality and delivery methods. Our findings offer some insightful 
implications for understanding the use of complex suicide attacks. 
First, it reveals that the phenomenon of complex suicide attacks reduces civilian 
casualties, in general revealing a low rate of civilian to combat deaths. This reduction in 
civilian deaths is a strategic effort to chip away the legitimacy of the Somali 
government and for the group to offer itself as a viable alternative of legitimate 
governance to the Somali government. Further, reducing civilian casualties keeps the 
group’s patron, Al-Qaeda, satisfied as it adheres to the general guidelines it prescribed. 
Second, suicide vehicle bombs remain the most popular devices used in complex 
and simple suicide attacks. 






Third, Al-Shabaab espouses that its main targets are AMISOM and other 
international personnel, however, Somali targets bear the brunt of the majority of all 
complex suicide attacks, revealing no change in targeting patterns between simple and 
complex attacks, aside from increased frequency. 
Fourth, our data suggest that Al-Shabaab is on the back foot, revealing a sharp 
drop in complex attacks since 2017. Despite this, Al-Shabaab remains a potent threat 
and is still able to carry out deadly complex attacks to achieve its strategic goals, albeit 
at low frequency. A new approach is required. 
The findings of this paper shed a light on the phenomenon of complex suicide 
attacks which hitherto has been absent in academic literature. They inform security and 
intelligence agencies and other policymakers the rationale behind the choice, use and 
effect of varied modes of suicide bombing attacks against identified targets. These 
findings have the potential to make an important contribution to the development of 
effective counter-terrorism strategies informed by prudent research and evidence. 
However, we recognise the possible limitation of this research including its lack 
of examining the extent to which the current Somali federal government is capitalising 
on these apparent weaknesses of Al-Shabaab. Whilst we see the merits of examining 
this issue, we take the view that it is outside the scope of our investigation. Another 
limitation emanating from our paper is the adoption of a single VEOs as a case study to 
explore the phenomenon of complex suicide attacks. 
Nevertheless, future research might explore the effectiveness of detecting, 
aborting and preventing Al-Shabaab terrorist suicide bombing activities. An 
examination is warranted for future research to test whether this paper’s findings can be 
observed in other groups who distinctively employ complex suicide attacks. 
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